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Ukraine belongs among those young countries where the beginnings of democratisation and 
nation-building approximately coincided. While the development of nation states in Central 
Europe was usually preceded by the development of nations, the biggest dilemma in the 
Ukraine is whether a nation-state programme – parallel to the aim of state-building – is able to 
bring unfinished nation-building to completion. Ukraine sways between the EU and Russia 
with enormous amplitude. The alternating orientation between the West and the East can be 
ascribed to superpower ambitions reaching beyond Ukraine. Eventually, internal and external 
determinants are intertwined and mutually interact with one another. The aim of the paper is 
to explain the dilemmas arising from identity problems behind the Ukraine’s internal and 
external orientation. 
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1. Introduction 
After achieving its independence, the Ukraine was standing at a crossroads. With the collapse 
of the Soviet Union the question arose: what kind of dynamics can be expected in the 
political, economic and social transition of this Eastern-European country? Will it be its 
Western or Eastern areas that take centre stage from a regional point of view? In the Ukraine, 
the dilemma of geopolitical orientation also emerged in terms of whether the state wanted to 
open up to the West or to the East. 
 
In connection with all these factors, the country also had to cope with a special burden: the 
problem of nation-building. The existence or lack of a coherent national identity has a 
fundamental effect on the nature, quality and dynamics of transition and self-definition in the 
international space. 
 
The aim of the paper is to explain the dilemmas arising from identity problems behind the 
internal and external orientation of the Ukraine. I argue that Ukrainian national self-
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identification is closely connected with the Ukrainian nation’s differentiation from others and 
with its orientations, but the problem of Ukrainian nation-building is manifold: 
1. The cultural ideas stemming from markedly different historical roots in the Eastern 
and Western parts of the country militate against each other. 
2. The economic elite – taking advantage of the opportunities provided by the cultural 
cleavage – has an interest in perpetuating division in order to obtain/maintain state 
support. 
3. There is no national concept in politics seeking to achieve national reconciliation and 
rise above differences in sight. 
4. The myths on which the identities of the two opposing blocks are based are less 
crystallised, which has a conflict-mitigating effect. 
 
To investigate these hypotheses, in the first part of the paper I will examine the historical 
predecessors of Ukrainian nation-building. Afterwards I will present the cultural aspects of 
nation-building. I will analyse the confronting cultural ideas and the economic and political 
causes of persistent diversity and discuss the conflict-mitigating effect of less pure identities 
in a separate subsection. In the second half of the paper I will focus on the Ukraine’s 
endeavours in terms of international orientation with regard to the European Union and 
Russia. 
 
2. Conceptional and methodological framework 
I find it important to define the notion of nation-building, as several studies dealing with 
international politics fail to define the set of concepts they are working with and what they 
mean by nation-building. 
 
When it comes to nation-building many experts analyse the problems of homogeneity, using 
the American terminology (theories and models of assimilation and modernisation),
1
 whereby 
the main aim is to establish a common identity of different nations. Others are of the view that 
it must not be prescribed; instead, a coexistence of people must be organised despite their 
                                                             
1
 In case of Daniel Lerner’s model of communication and modernisation or Robert Park’s theory of ethnic 
assimilation, the key to nation-building is a society of maximum homogeneity, which is defined by the number 
of shared features of different social groups. Both models find desirable the elimination of differences (arising 
from ethnicity, cognitive thinking and social manifestations) in order to establish a cohesive, productive, fair and 
rich society (Shah 2003). 
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differences. In such a case the process of nation-building may entail the dissolution of old 
states and the emergence of new ones (Ottaway 2002). 
 
Many experts do not differentiate between nation-building and state-building, whereas they 
only overlap in part and refer to different processes. The mixing of these notions can lead to 
serious confusion in interpretation. The process of re-building a state is considered nation-
building by many (Talentino 2002). By definition, the state is the totality of supreme public 
authorities and bodies; it possesses supreme power in a particular country, i.e. it is a territorial 
entity. Contrary to this, a nation is a constructed community whose identity is linked to a 
common historical area, culture, national economy and legal system. 
 
In the paper I consider only the union by some kind of common link of different ethnic, 
religious and cultural groups as nation-building. In looking at Ukrainian nation-building I will 
analyse the strength and cognitive features of psychological relations existing within a 
society, i.e. the homogeneity of the social perspective. I will use the category system of Linz 
and Stepan (1996) to judge what chances Ukraine as a multinational state has of deepening 
democratisation and preserving its own territorial unity via its nation-building efforts. In their  
view, the more diverse a state is from the aspect of language, nationality, religion and culture, 
the more complex politics should be to lay the foundations for democracy.
2
 They examine the 
‘interconnection’ between the state, the nation(s) and democratisation. They form six 
categories based on the “degree of presence of other ‘nations’ besides the titular nation in the 
territory of the state”. 
 
After the first part of the paper I will also use the Linz – Stepan model to evaluate nation-
building in Ukraine. I will seek an answer to where the Ukraine can be placed in the category 
system of Linz and Stepan based on the presence of different nationalities. Based on that we 
may find an answer to whether Ukraine is on the road towards solidifying a multinational 
state, or whether there is a realistic chance of territorial separation, an issue often covered by 
the media. 
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 Although it does not mean that in a multinational and multicultural state democracy cannot be stabilised; 
significant political steps are necessary. 
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Table 1. Possibilities for democracy and nation-states depending on the existence of other nations and state policies 
 Policies and actions of state leaders of the ‘Titular Nation’ 
Degree of presence of other 
‘nations’ besides the titular 
nation within state territory 
Drives towards the 
goal of nation-state 
Extends some recognition 
to the legitimacy of 
cultural diversity 
Crafts some federal or quasi-
federal institutions and/or quasi-
consociational practices 
Accepts in principle the 
possibility of peaceful and 
democratic negotiated secession 
No clear, or 
extremely weak 
state leaders 
No other nation exists and 
there is little cultural and/or 
ethnic differentiation 
Democratic nation-
state can easily 
consolidate and be 
strong. 
  
Mononational democratic state 
can easily exist. 
    
No other nation exists but 
extensive cultural diversity 
  
Democratic state-nation 
can easily exist. 
Mononational democratic state 
can easily exist. 
    





can easily exist 
      




difficult but not 
impossible. 
Democratic state-nation 
can exist but will be under 
pressure to move toward 
Multinational state is only 
democratic possibility. If crafted 
carefully, democracy can be 
consolidated. 
If a clearly demarcated territorial 
base exists, peaceful secession is 
possible with democracy in both 
new states. 
  
Other nation(s) present and 
militant 







can exist but difficult to 
consolidate.  
Multinational state is only 
democratic possibility but 
prospect for consolidation 
difficult.  
If no territorial base exists, 
‘velvet divorce’ is impossible 
and if militancy persists 
democracy cannot be 
consolidated. 
  
No group has sufficient 
cohesion and identity to be a 
nation-builder 
        
No state possible 
so democracy is 
impossible 
 
Source: Linz – Stepan (1996). 
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3. Nation-building – A historical background 
During democratic transition, societies are faced by the greatest challenges in those countries 
where the establishment of state institutions was not preceded by the process of nation-
building (Dawisha – Parrott 1997). In this case the majority society may have the opportunity 
to politically marginalise other nationalities in order to accelerate the development of 
common national identity. This problem often arises in the case of new states that are merged 
from several old states or formed by separation from an old state. In the Ukraine we can see 
both cases.
3 
 The political and cultural ideas and the foundations of identity-building existing 
in the Western and Eastern parts of the Ukraine are extremely different; furthermore, they 
slow down the dynamics of transition and hinder the crystallisation of orientations. Division 
has a number of dimensions, which can largely be attributed to historical grounds. 
 
In his work entitled ‘The Russian Empire from 1801-1917’, Watson (1967) names two 
historical nodes, which are of utmost importance from the point of view of Ukrainian national 
development. One of them is connected with the Kievan Rus, the other with the Hmelnicky-
movement. In the case of the former, the existence of fundamental cultural differences 
between the Eastern Slavic nations is questionable to prove. The most debated historical 
period of the topic coincides with the establishment of the Kievan Rus and the Moscow state. 
In the case of the latter Watson concludes that in the middle of the 17
th
 century we can already 
find endeavours which can be a precursor of Ukraine’s vision of independence. 
 
Although by the 18
th
 century the desire for independence and the nostalgia for the Hmelnicky-
movement were largely intertwined among the Ukrainian elite, judgement of the movement 
and the orientation of Ukrainian areas already show a high degree of polarisation in this 
period.
 
 Its cause can be understood more easily if we know the geopolitical situation of the 




 centuries. In 1667, Poland and Russia divided up areas on the right 
and left banks of the Dnieper River. During the first division of Poland in 1772, the Galician 
areas populated by Ukrainians became part of the Habsburg Empire; during the third division 
in 1795, more parts of Ukraine were annexed to the Russian Empire, where the absolutist 
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 During the Soviet Union, the Ukraine was created from territories formerly under Polish-Habsburg influence 
and parts of the former Russian Empire. In 1991 the Ukraine separated from the Soviet Union to become 
independent. 
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system of tzarism was in operation. In Galicia, nationalities had greater room for movement.
4
 
The price of diverging paths of development in the Eastern and Western areas was the 
impossibility for the concept of a united and independent Ukrainian state to strengthen, or 
even to form. 
 
From the second half of the 19
th
 century, the period of Ukrainian enlightenment, the 
interaction between Ukrainian versus Great Russian (later Soviet) identity became dominant. 
Of the two significantly different historical perceptions one represented the Ukrainian national 
line, which considered accession to Russia to be dictated by necessity. The other clearly 
supported ‘reunification’ ignoring specific Ukrainian national characteristics altogether and, 
as opposed to Ukrainian autonomy, considered the area part of the empire. 
 
Thus it can be concluded that the precursors of national identity as counter-effects of 
Habsburg and Polish authorities already appeared in the 17
th
 century in the Western part of 
modern Ukraine. These were later gradually strengthened from the East by repeated Russian 
and Soviet strivings for homogenisation. From the point of view of national identity, the 
situation of what is today’s Central and Eastern Ukraine was completely different, where a 
special identity could develop as part of the former Russian Empire. In the East, the 
penetration of Ukrainian national movements and nationalism was less typical. As a political 
and cultural result of all this, loyalty towards the Soviet system and the spread of the Russian 
language and culture were much more typical here than in the Western areas. 
 
4. The cultural aspects of nation-building 
4.1. Opposing cultural ideas 
The national identity of the Ukrainian population is extremely fragmented geographically. A 
quasi-ethnic type of cleavage makes confrontation between markedly different ideas in the 
Western and Eastern parts of Ukraine the easiest to capture. Although a number of 
                                                             
4
 In the period of the Habsburg Monarchy, autonomy also existed for a while, though it benefited the Polish 
nobility living in Ukrainian territories rather than the Ukrainians. In other words, Ukrainians lived in dual 
serfdom – under the reign of the Habsburg Empire on the one hand, and under the Polish nobility, on the other. 
But a local parliament existed and Ukrainians could also delegate representatives to the empire’s parliament. 
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nationalities can be found in the country,
5
 the most significant cultural confrontation can be 
experienced between the Russian and Ukrainian community. 
 
Most of Ukraine’s population is of Ukrainian nationality, they constitute 77.8 per cent of a 
population of approximately 46 million. They are followed by the Russian minority of 8.3 
million making up 17.3 per cent of the population. They live mostly in the areas of Luhansk, 
Harkiv, Sumi and Doneck counties and in the southern parts of Mikolajiv Herson and Odessa 
county (Jevtuh 2009).  
 
With regards to identity, it can be concluded that monoethnic Ukrainians make up more than 
half of the population and monoethnic Russians only come after biethnic (Russian-Ukrainian, 
Ukrainian-Russian) groups in number. A different regional distribution is also observable: the 
number of monoethnic Ukrainians grows towards the West, while that of biethnic Ukrainians 
increases towards the East. 
 
After 1991 we also have to consider a so-called reidentification process: Soviet identity was 
replaced by a new Ukrainian identity, which was not a smooth process. The dominant Russian 
ethnicity became a national minority, a diaspora. While in a political, economic and 
geographical sense they are part of the Ukrainian nation, from an ethnic point of view they 
still consider themselves Russian. Yet in the past one and a half to two decades more and 
more people of Russian ethnicity have come to consider themselves as Ukrainian citizens. 
However, parallel to the reidentification process the Russians’ sense of insecurity and 
vulnerability has grown as well (Arbenina 2009). 
 
Still, the ethnic type of division between the population of Russian and Ukrainian identity 
cannot be interpreted narrowly as a conflict between nationalities, because the former does 
not consider itself a minority. The problem of different identities observable in the Western 
and Eastern parts of the country cannot be resolved by using the concepts and solution options 
based on the paradigm of a minority-majority conflict. 
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 For example, ethnic Hungarians in Carpathian Ukraine, Greek and Bulgarian minorities in Southern Ukraine, 
Moldavians, Romanians and Poles from Galicia, whose areas were annexed to modern Ukraine mostly in the 
Soviet era. 
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The most remarkable examples of quasi-ethnic and cultural division are linguistic differences. 
Before 1991, the Ukrainian language was discriminated, while Russian was favoured. 
Although the situation has changed much since then, Russian continues to have a significant 
role in every area of communication, which the forces coming to power in the Orange 
Revolution have not been able to change even in the past half decade. 
 
In Ukraine, three large linguistic-ethnic groups co-exist: Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians, 
Russian-speaking Ukrainians and Russian-speaking Russians. In 2007, in an opinion poll 
based on a sample of 1,800 respondents, the Institute of Sociology of the Ukrainian National 
Academy of Science examined the linguistic-ethnic situation of the above groups; the results 
were summarised by Aza (2009). The survey results suggest that 85.2 per cent of Ukrainian 
people consider Ukrainian as their mother tongue, contrary to 67.5 per cent of the total 
population of the country. 29.6 per cent of the population consider Russian as their mother 
tongue, which is much higher than the 17.3 per cent ratio of Russian ethnicity in the overall 
population (Aza 2009). Although the data show that the Ukrainian language does not function 
as a state language in all areas of life or in all regions of the country, the strengthening of its 
positions besides the significant role of the Russian language is also observable. 
 
Historical memory and ethnic division have also generated a quasi-communist – 
anticommunist conflict. Western nation-builders consider Russian as an expression of 
nostalgia for the Soviet system, pan-slavism and the desire for reunion with Russia. By 
contrast, the ‘anti-Soviet’ Western interpretation of history does not have many followers 
among the Eastern Russian-speaking population. In the case of linguistic differences, the main 
problem is not that of verbatim non-understanding, but cultural conflicts behind the 
languages, which are rooted in the common historical past. 
 
The significantly different Eastern and Western types of cultural ideas have produced national 
myths fighting against each other. Such a crucial contrast is the conflicting interpretation of 
the Soviet past, especially with regards to the period of World War 2, when the Western and 
Eastern areas often fought against each other.
6
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 The Western Ukrainian areas fought both against the Nazis and the Russian army to achieve the national 
liberation of Ukraine. By contrast, the Eastern areas fought against the Nazis with the Russians for the liberation 
of Soviet-Ukraine. After World War 2, Eastern-Ukrainians, as opposed to the Western areas, did not suffer from 
direct Russian oppression, so history’s Soviet type of narrative is much more widespread. 
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Similar, but not so significant conflicts can be experienced in the area of religion, too, where 
besides the confrontation between the patriarchates of Moscow and Kiev a conflict going back 
for centuries between the Unitus and Ortodox churches is becoming increasingly politicised. 
These issues are also inescapable because the role of religion has clearly increased in Ukraine 
since the beginning of the 1990s. ‘Traditional Christian churches have become closely 
interconnected with national and cultural identity, and thus they can have a role in 
reconsidering the historical past, exploring the idea of nation, developing new identities, and 
even choosing the political trend of the country’ (Vasrova 2009: 283). 
 
In today’s Ukraine, the Pravoslav church is considered to be dominant. However, this does 
not mean that society would be monolithic from a religious point of view. The Pravoslav 
church shows an extremely differentiated picture in different regions of Ukraine, as certain 
modern Ukrainian areas used to be under the influence of different church organisations 
throughout history. The Ukrainian Autocephalous Pravoslav Church (autocephalous
7
 UPC) 
and the Ukrainian Pravoslav Church were reformed as the Ukrainian exarchate of the Russian 
Pravoslav church (UPC of Moscow). The Ukrainian Pravoslav Church of the Patriarchate of 
Kiev (UPC of Kiev) was established in 1992, which is in second place with regards to the 
number of church communities. None of the churches have equal influence in all regions of 
the country. The unification of still fragmented Ukrainian Pravoslavia can be solved by the 
establishment of a national Ukrainian church. The Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church (UGCC) 




4.2. The economic and political reasons for the perpetuation of cultural division 
Ukrainian cultural division is also underpinned by economic interests. According to Tamás 
(2007), two large and a marginal capitalist group can be distinguished, which follow 
significantly different strategies. The first one is composed of industry leaders, an Eastern-
Ukrainian oligarchy of Russian identity, who are interested in increasing exports and would 
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 Churches not depending on other churches in an administrative sense are called autocephalous by Pravoslav 
believers. 
8
 The religious formation was born from the Union of Brest in 1596 as a unitus, or Greek-Catholic church. In the 
course of history, the Russian Orthodox Church sought to destroy and assimilate it mostly with the state’s help. 
Although the church was dissolved in 1946, it continued its operation. Eventually, the reorganisation of the 
UGCC started in 1989. Today it is seen as the third biggest congregation in the Ukraine. It has a monopoly 
position in the Western areas of the country, where it is part of national identity, but today the denomination can 
be found in all regions of Ukraine. 
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like to achieve increasingly strong positions in the international markets. Their main export 
sector is metallurgy concentrated in the Eastern side of the country. The other major economic 
interest group is more interested in the commercial, financial and food industry sector 
connected with international capital. As for their identity, they are Ukrainians who – contrary 
to the first group – mainly support growth in imports. Their natural allies are foreign 
producers exporting to the Ukraine, multinational companies and the population with 




These two main economic interest groups are extremely vulnerable because of their special 
industrial commitments. The global economic crisis reveals the weaknesses of the economic 
sphere to a large extent.
10
 Although the above-described economic interest groups follow a 
diametrically different strategy, they are similar in one feature. Both seek to gain economic 
policy support from the state. Thus both interest groups support a political regime with a left-
wing economic policy programme. 
 
Before the global economic crisis, policy-making along a cultural faultline became the major 
identifying label for the alliance of parties presenting similar economic programmes. That is 
what brings us from the economic elite’s economic value system basically independent of 
cultural rifts to the perpetuation of national identity debates in mainstream politics. The 
Ukrainian nationalist political elite primarily supports interest groups interested in imports, 
while those involved in heavy industry are helped by the representatives of the Eastern-
Ukrainian Russian-speaking or simply Russian-identity political side. So cultural ideas and 
economic interests are reversed. The culturally right-wing political elite helps globalist 
economic interests, while the government – supporting the mostly Russian-speaking 
population and otherwise considered unpatriotic by the former – supports heavy industry, 
which is seen as a national economic mainstay, concentrated in the East. 
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 The third one is a mid-entrepreneur class, which is interested in changing the existing status quo, thus winning 
a growth opportunity and economic space for itself. 
10
 Before the onset of the crisis, metallurgy was seen as the most successful export industry of the country, but 
due to its enormous energy needs it was very much dependent on Russian energy sources. Ukraine’s accession to 
the World Trade Organization caused further problems to the indutry, since the industrial facilities of the country 
were exposed to fierce competitition in the global markets. Exporters wanted to gain time to adjust to new 
circumstances. Contrary to heavy industry, importers were interested in the complete opening up of national 
markets. But the crisis radically reduced the purchasing power of the population in Ukraine; the credit crunch led 
to reduced output in the West. 
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The present Ukrainian elite therefore makes use of the existing cultural division to achieve 
their political goals, using it as a mobilising factor. In the referendum on independence held 
on the 1
st
 of December 1991, more than 90 per cent of participants voted for the complete 
independence of the country. The majority of the Eastern-Ukrainian population of Russian 
identity also voted for the independence of Ukraine (Sz. Bíró 2009). This result was also seen 
as a positive development by the political elite of the time, because the Ukrainian legislature 
had already voted for the independence of Ukraine in August 1991. However, the national 
alternative was not united but emerged by two opposing opinions. Thus independence could 
not be coupled with unification. 
 
Problems became perceptible right after 1991. In order ‘to sell the new world abroad, culture 
was left to the care of previously half- or quarter-opposition literarians and philosophers from 
the countryside. Those people happened to be Galicians, i.e. they came from the North-
Western part of the country and their programme was centred around the national language, 
and they were extremely impatient towards any other cultural programme’ (Tamás 2007: 7). 
However, the Ukrainian national programme outlined this way was seen as strange by many, 
especially in the Eastern and Southern ends of the country. 
 
From the mid-1990s, economic clans organised on a regional basis started to emerge, for 
example in the Doneck basin in the East and in the region of Dnepropetrovsk in the South-
East. Regional attachments started to spread across the party system too. Business pervaded 
politics and the lack of advanced market institutions led to the concentration of assets in the 
hands of the few who had political ties. “Redistribution coalitions” (Olson 1965) and the 
processes of “state capture” (Hellman et al. 2000) were quick to emerge. 
 
Thus the concentration of cultural and economic interests increased. By this time, obvious 
economic interests had been permeated by elements of national cultural identity. Cultural 
features became more important than belonging to the left wing or the right wing in the 
economic sense. The extreme social polarisation and ideological division also generated by 
the political and economic elite peaked during the 2004 presidential elections. However, 
during the campaign ‘slogans aiming for division were driven by perceived social orientation, 
rather than ideology: European Union vs. Single Economic Space; joining NATO vs. military 
alliance with Russia; granting Russian the status of state language vs. rejecting it; Ukrainian 
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nationalism vs. double cultural identity; rejecting vs. accepting the Soviet era of Ukrainian 
history’ (Fedinec 2007: 94). 
 
According to this view, the Orange Revolution turned out to be a cultural-ethnic revolution; 
the factor of historical identity also played a key role in voter dividedness and its deepening.  
The latter category was worked out by Lemberg-based sociologist Victoria Sereda and gives a 
kind of explanation of Ukraine’s “East-West” divided (Sereda 2002). 
 
After the Orange Revolution, the victory of Western-oriented groups and radical nationals 
seemed to be potentially long-lasting but that did not come to pass. In February 2010, Viktor 
Yanukovych won the second round of the Ukrainian presidential elections, thus ending the 
reign of the powers considered Western by many after the Orange Revolution. Although the 
contrasts arising from national identity seem to be calming down, this cannot be explained by 
the emergence of a unifying national idea but rather by the onset of the global economic crisis 
and the Orange Revolution’s becoming a spent force. 
 
4.3. The conflict-mitigating effect of less crystallised identities 
While the foundation of most Central European states was preceded by the birth of nations, in 
the Ukraine the development of national consciousness is based on unfinished and extremely 
polarised ideas, which are also perpetuated by the prevailing political and economic elite of 
the day. These existing polarised identities are less crystallised. 
 
The commitment of Western-type Ukrainian nationalism to the ‘West’ is not considered to be 
unproblematic at all. “The nationalists criticised liberal democracies for neglecting the 
national issue and collaborating with the communists and the Soviet power. For Ukrainian 
nationalism, political identification with the ‘West’ became possible only with the Cold War 
and the radical polarisation of the two political systems and ideologies. And only after the fall 
of the Berlin Wall was Ukrainian national identity reconstructed by the intellectual elites as 
‘European’, or rather ‘Euroatlantic’” (Zhurzhenko 2002: 7). The national and nationalist 
perception originating from Western-Ukraine is not based on a crystallised system of ideas. In 
a cultural sense, Ukrainian national identity and the current endeavours for Western 
orientation much rather feed on the protest-driven perception of the Soviet-type regime and 
the economic, social and political transitions taking place at the turn of 1980s and 1990s. 
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The debate about the perception of the Ukrainian famine (Holodomor) between April 1932 
and October 1933 is a good example of recalling tragedies afflicting the nation ‘from the 
outside’. In one of the most shocking chapters of Ukrainian history several million people 
died of starvation. Former Ukrainian president Viktor Yushchenko, an emblematic figure of 
the 2004 Orange Revolution, initiated a widespread campaign to make Holodomor accepted 




The national orientation of the Eastern part of the country does not have appropriate symbolic 
ammunition to forge a single national identity either. Soviet-type imperial ideology is out-of-
date and thus less presentable. The older generations’ loyalty to the Soviets does not outlive 
long that of young persons. Ethno-nationalists aiming for the equal status of the language do 
not have a substantive social base either. Ethnic Russians do not have a relevant political 
organisation. With the collapse of the Soviet Union the number of ethnic Russians decreased 
by 3 million, or 26 per cent, between 1989 and 2001; meanwhile, Russian retained its high 
social status in independent Ukraine, too. In respect of higher-education degrees, they 
outnumber the Ukrainian population. Russian people living in the city earn higher wages, live 
in better equipped households and fill more managerial positions and are more highly 
qualified. Meanwhile, these differences have decreased since 1991; so there is no ethnic 
differentiation in this sense. On the whole, there is little prejudice against Russians and a high 
degree of acceptance between the two ethnicities even as a duality of ethnic self-awareness 
exists (Arbenina 2009). This seems to be guaranteed by the fact that there are very few people 
within the Russian-identity population who were raised in a purely Russian family; they 
mostly live in mixed families. 
 
So-called Russification, or Russian cultural influence, did not cease to exist in Ukraine after it 
becoming independent in 1991; it remains an integral part of everyday life. In case of radio 
and television, Aza’s research about media consumption pointed out that 61 per cent of the 
Russian population listen to news only in their mother tongue. Among Ukrainians this value 
is only 24.5 per cent. The survey has found that the ratio of Russian language in case of 
reading (newspapers and literature) is similarly high (Aza 2009). It can be concluded that the 
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 Many Ukrainians quoting historical sources claim that at Stalin’s command the Soviet government wanted to 
root out Ukrainian national self-identity by starvation. In 2008 Valentin Nalivaychenko, leader of the Ukrainian 
Security Service (USS) demanded legal proceedings in the case. On the other hand, according to Russia no 
targeted genocide took place, which they say is also proved by archive data. In their opinion the great famine 
struck not only Ukraine, but the area of the whole Soviet Union. 
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Ukrainian public is informed from the Ukrainian and the Russian media to a similar extent. In 
politics, business, education and daily conversations the Russian language is still dominant. It 
means that Russian continues to function as a kind of intermediary language in the country. 
 
4.4. The category system of Linz and Stepan and Ukrainian nation-building 
After the cultural aspects of nation-building I use the category system of Linz and Stepan 
(1996) to judge what chances Ukraine as a multinational state has of deepening 
democratisation and preserving its own territorial unity via its nation-building efforts. Linz 
and Stepan created 6 categories based on the degree of the presence of other nations besides 
the titular nation within the state territory (table 1). In the Ukraine there are other nations and 
major cultural and ethnic differentiations and cultural diversity. Thus the first category is by 
definition excluded. Of the nationalities to be found in the country at least two, the Russian 
and Ukrainian ethnic groups, are far from vegetating and have sufficient cohesion and identity 
to be a nation-builder. Therefore categories number 3 and 6 can also be excluded. Ukraine is 
situated on the boundary of categories number 4 and 5. Although there are conflicts between 
ethnicities in case of category number 4 the establishment of democracy is not impossible, but 
in case of the significant lines of demarcation between the ethnicities, the possibility of 
peaceful separation also exists. By contrast, in case of category number 5 the stabilisation of 
democracy is almost impossible because of the high number of conflicts. Unless the conflicts 
have a well-defined territorial boundary, the tension remains continuous and democracy 
cannot be stabilised. 
 
It is doubtful to what extent the self-conscious Russian and Ukrainian ethnicities considered 
by many to be treated as fellow nations are ‘awakened’ or ‘militant’, or whether the 
possibility for these two communities to live together despite their differences exists. Another 
crucial issue shading the model of Linz and Stepan is whether Ukraine’s ‘Eastern’ or 
‘Western’ foreign political orientations become dominant. I think that the relevant question is 
not who Ukrainians consider themselves to be but how they feel about where and to whom 
they belong. 
 
5. The geopolitical aspects of nation-building 
In the history of Ukraine foreign policy factors have had an effect on both nation-building and 
state-building, which did not change much when the Cold War and the bipolar world order 
ended. In analysing the foreign policy aspects of Ukrainian national identity, the relevant 
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question is not who Ukrainians consider themselves to be but how they feel about where and 
to whom they belong.
12
 The choice of the Ukraine’s foreign policy directions depends on 
many external factors and on the will of many uncircumventable geopolitical actors. From the 
West it is the ever expanding European Union, the United States and NATO, while from the 
East it is Russia, the regional superpower surviving the problems of the 1990s and still 
considering the republics of the former Soviet Union as parts of its sphere of interest, have an 
effect on Ukraine’s orientation strivings. 
 
5.1. The Ukraine’s foreign policy motivations and changing orientation 
Reaching independence in 1991 created the possibility of democratic transition and the 
development of a market economy, and thus political and economic integration towards the 
West for Ukraine. However, in the 1990s it became evident that Ukraine’s efforts in state- and 
nation-building did not have as much momentum as it could be expected at the moment of 
seceding from the Soviet Union, and thus in its democratisation and switching to a market 
economy it also lagged well behind Central and Eastern European states. The Ukraine’s 
political elite was continuously balancing between West and East, between the European 
Union and Russia. 
 
The essence of this ‘multivectoral’ foreign policy, a term used by Ukrainians to describe it, is 
to extract the greatest possible commercial and economic advantage from the EU without 
having to start the radical transformation of the social and political system (with special 
regard to the network of political and business interest groups developed after reaching 
independence) and endangering the relationship with Russia. 
 
During the second free election after becoming independent in 1991, Leonid Kuchma won the 
presidential elections with a Russian-friendly programme, counting on the votes of those 
being disappointed in the years after gaining independence, when the state was moving too far 
away from Russia. Before his re-election in 1999 ‘due to the internal political and economic 
problems becoming ever more serious and recurring corruption scandals he had also changed 
his foreign policy orientation: he had given up the pro-Russian course. He initiated a Western 
programme and won’ (Sz. Bíró 2009: 10). In the 1997 autumn session of the Ukrainian 
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 Certainly, Ukrainian foreign policy orientations are dominant not only in a cultural sense, but also in respect of 
international economic and political dependence and interactions and the commitment of potential partners, 
which is reflected mostly by the support or rejection of Ukrainian endeavours. 
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parliament, the Verhovna Rada, the detailed EU integration programme of the country was 
accepted. In June 1998, a presidential decree laid down the European integration strategy of 
the country, the major aim of which was full membership through associate membership. 
 
But the scandals surrounding Kuchma did not diminish in his second term of office; on the 
contrary, they intensified. Meanwhile the goal of accession to the EU continued to exist. 
According to the presidential strategy presented in the Parliament in June 2002, Ukraine 
would be able to meet the criteria of associate membership by 2011. In the same year a 
parliamentary European integration committee was established. But the EU was not a partner 
in these efforts.
13
 Probably this also contributed to the fact that in the spring of 2003 Ukraine 
co-signed a convention with Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan about the establishment of a so-
called Common Economic Space. 
 
Before the 2004 elections yet another change in orientation took place, whereby the Ukraine 
turned against Russia again. Kuchma did not take part in the elections at the end of October, 
but he supported the campaign of Yanukovych also backed up by Moscow, who in the end 
lost to pro-Western Yushchenko in the election repeated because of the Orange Revolution. 
The obvious aim of the new president was to join the West as soon as possible,
14
 and thus met 
with Moscow’s disapproval. This could be seen inter alia in the permanent conflicts 
surrounding the energy transit. The determined presidential efforts were not very successful 
either. It can be mostly attributed to the increasingly tense relations within the Orange 
coalition,
 
a drastic decrease in public support of Yushchenko and the politics of pro-Russian 
forces during the presidential term.
 
 
In the end, the presidential elections in February 2010 were won by Victor Yanukovych 
followed by Yulia Tymoshenko, which resulted in another change in direction. The new 
president now broke with the dominating Western orientation of the Orange forces and 
engaged in more balanced politics between the European Union and Russia. Ukraine now 
                                                             
13
 According to Clement and Vincentz (2005) Ukraine’s convergence will take 20 years in a best-case scenario, 
and at least 60 years in a worst-case scenario, as integration would generate far more disadvantages than benefits 
to an economically weak country.  
14
 At the January 2005 session of the European Council’s Parliamentary Assembly, Viktor Yushchenko 
committed himself to the European integration of Ukraine, which also received a positive feedback from the EU. 
Jose Manuel Barroso, President of the European Commission welcomed ‘Ukraine’s return to the European 
family’. 
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tries to preserve its good relationships with Brussels while significantly opening up to 
Moscow politically and economically.
15




5.2. The West and Ukraine 
Although the dialogue with the Ukraine has been continuous, the European Union and its 
member states have stimulated its endeavours for integration only at the level of declarations. 
The former Western member states of the Soviet Union – except for the Baltic states – are 
important security policy factors for the European Union. Thus during the 1990s different 
kinds of aid was provided for economic and political stabilisation, democratisation, 
humanitarian affairs and – especially because of the experience with Chernobyl – nuclear 
safety. 
 
The European Union considered the former socialist states to be candidates for membership, 
but this did not include the states of the former Soviet Union. A major reason for this was that 
the areas still largely depended on Moscow, belonged to its decisive sphere of interests, 
moreover they had not existed as sovereign and independent European countries before. The 
lag in nation-building and state-building also had a negative effect on democratisation. 
Besides, in the 1990s Ukraine did not belong to the immediate neighbourhood of the then 
EU15. This problem was placed on the agenda during the Eastern enlargement of the 
European Union. At the 1999 Helsinki summit, a four-year Ukraine strategy was adopted, 
which urged a much more unified action by the member states of the Union towards the 
Eastern-European country, especially in the areas of economic transition, democratisation and 
home and justice cooperation. In case of the latter, we find mostly security policy 
considerations in the background. 
 
In December 2003, when the enlargement of the EU15 and thus the immediate neighbourhood 
with countries belonging to the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) was to be taken 
                                                             
15
 Following his election, Yanukovych stated that the Ukraine wishes to act as a stabilising power between the 
East and the West. The first foreign trip of the Ukrainian president lead to Brussels before Moscow, where he 
named European integration a major foreign policy aim of the country, but he did not want to tighten his 
relations with NATO. The Russian Black Sea fleet’s stay at Sevastopol was extended; in return Russia would 
decrease the price of Russian natural gas transported to the Ukraine by 30 per cent for 10 years. 
16
 There is a feud between the two parties regarding the gas agreement of January 2009, the unification of 
Naftogaz and Gazprom, and the accession of Ukraine to the Russian-Belorussian-Kazakh customs union. 
Besides, disagreements occured because of maneuvers in the Black Sea and the appearance of the USS Monterey 
rocket cruiser in the Black Sea. 
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for granted, a Strategy Paper on the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) based on the 
‘wider Europe’ concept was born, which concerned the Southern, Eastern and later Caucasian 
neighbourhood of the EU (Commission of the European Communities 2004). 
 
The ENP offers political and economic cooperation in case of the fulfillment of a detailed set 
of conditions. The main aim of the Eastern Neighbourhood Policy is the stabilisation of the 
countries in the region through democratisation. However, it must be pointed out that the ENP 
did not constitute an independent chapter in the budgetary policy of the EU until 2007. 
Although the 2007-2013 financial perspective does now contain an independent chapter for 
the purposes of the ENP (the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI)), 
the programme has several weaknesses. First, the biggest weakness of the neighbourhood 
policy was that the EU as a whole was not able to intervene effectively in favourable or 
unfavourable processes taking place in its neighbourhood; in the former case let us remember 
the 2004 Ukrainian Orange Revolution or, in the latter case, the Russian-Ukrainian gas crises 
taking place during the turn of 2005-2006 and 2008-2009,
17
 which caused serious supply 
problems in the Eastern part of the European Union. 
 
Second, it did not offer a final goal to the participants in a political sense and did not establish 
institutions jointly operated by the Union and its partners, and thus the ENP remains 
extremely vulnerable because of the different preferences of the EU member states’ 
neighbourhood policies. 
 
Further, the effectiveness of the programme is weakened by the fact that it does not have a 
single perception among the member states of the Union, one of the reasons being different 
perceptions of bilateral relations with Russia, the other being different perspectives and 
directions of the integration.
 
 
The difficulties surrounding the reconciliation of foreign policy interests were explained by 
many factors on the EU’s part, including the weakness of the European Union’s foreign 
policy. The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) hardly showed any kind of 
integration. Many people expected serious changes from the Lisbon Treaty in the area of 
                                                             
17
 Let us just think about the 4 January 2009 position of the Czech Republic holding the EU’s rotating 
presidency, according to which the Union did not have to intervene as an intermediary, since the EU’s energy 
supplyt was not seriously threatened. 
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Common Foreign and Security Policy, still no profound reforms came to be adopted. 
‘Although the pillar system and the accompanying strong fragmentation ceases to exist, the 
common foreign policy based on the Lisbon Treaty will maintain its fundamentally 
intergovernmental feature with separate rules for decision-making and operation’ (Horváth – 
Ódor 2010: 300). 
 
The Eastern Partnership serves the deepening of relationships between the European Union 
and the member states of the former Soviet Union. The project launched by the EU entered 
into force in Prague on 7 May 2009. The aim of the programme is to tighten the economic and 
political relationship between the EU and six countries, namely Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, 
Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia. The EU is planning to spend 600 million Euros on the 
Eastern Partnership Programme until 2013, under which it wishes to stimulate the 
democratisation process and economic reforms. The ratified document pledged closer political 
and security policy cooperation in the future, with special regard to the area of energy. In 
return for reform, Brussels promised to finance the undertakings included in the programme 
(Council of the European Union 2009). In connection with the programme, Russia is 
concerned that the European Union is seeking to exclude it from its own sphere of interest, 




One of the crucial points of Western orientation could be accession to NATO, which many 
see as the anteroom for EU membership. The formal framework of cooperation was provided 
by the NATO-Ukraine Charter of Distinguished Partnership, which was created in 1997. This 
was followed by the NATO-Ukraine Action Plan in 2002 and, as an enhancement, the 
Intensive Dialogue of 2005. Although accession to the organisation came closer than ever 
before in the 2008 April summit by opening up the possibility of Ukraine’s full membership,18 
the process of integration came to a halt since no membership warranties were given to the 
country. As a result of the 2008 year-end decision, Ukraine could not cross the threshold of a 
critical stage, and thus the outlines of Western orientation perspectives seem to fade. 
 
5.3. Russia and Ukraine 
                                                             
18
 The corresponding document stated that membership depended on the will of the Ukrainian nation. 
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Russia has a major interest in keeping the countries of the CIS within its own sphere of 
interest or at least slowing down their moving away. This is not different in the case of 
Ukraine, either. Russia’s national security strategy published in May 2009 mentions close 
cooperation with the above-mentioned states as the most important priority of Russian foreign 
policy. ‘Russia – 2020’ sees economic cooperation with CIS countries on a bilateral and 
multilateral level as one of the key aims of Russian foreign economic policy. The foreign 
policy orientation of the Ukraine is influenced by Russia’s foreign policy to a great extent. 
Kiev is dependent on Russia in several respects. 
 
Economically, Russian economic growth starting from 1999 also had a positive effect on the 
Ukraine. At the beginning of the 2000s there was double-digit GDP growth for a few years, 
but following the 2004 Orange Revolution the economic upswing slowed down. It could also 
be attributed to weakening relationships with Russia in the period before the crisis.
 
In the area 
of politics we can also mention a number of occasions where there was an obvious 
intervention in Ukrainian politics. In the area of information, the pressure from the Russian 
media is also significant.
 
 
Ukraine is seen by Russia as a key foreign policy actor from two aspects: (1) in a security 
policy sense, the country is still seen as a buffer zone separating Russia from the West; (2) 
Ukraine is a significant export transit country for Russia towards the West. 
 
A crucial element of Ukrainian-Russian relationships is the status of the Crimean Peninsula. 
The area was given away to the then Ukrainian SSR by Khrushchev in 1954 as a ‘token of the 
Russian nation’s friendship’, in memory of the Treaty of Pereyaslav of 1654. It resulted in 
serious debates after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The area is important to the Russians 
not only because of ethnic relationships, but also because of its strategic position. After the 
Ukraine gained independence, years went by until some sort of settlement was reached on the 
area. Following a long and tedious procedure the Crimean constitution entered into force in 
1998. This strengthened the status of the peninsula as an integral part of the Ukraine and 
delegated independent powers to the region on a number of issues, but the status of the native 
Crimean Tatar minority was not addressed.
19
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 The Crimean Tatars live in extremely miserable economic conditions. 60 per cent of them are unemployed, 50 
per cent of them are not provided with housing, a quarter of the 291 Crimean Tatar towns lack electricity, 70 per 
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The status of the former Soviet fleet stationing in the Crimean Peninsula is also a source of 
conflict between the Ukraine and Russia. Under the Yeltsin-Kuchma agreement of 9 June 
1995 first the personnel stationing in Crimea was halved between the two countries. The base 
could stay in Sevastopol and Moscow is paying a rent for its use. Under the treaty, the 
Russian fleet could have stationed in the city until 2017, but in 2010 it was extended until 
2042. 
 
Besides the problems of the Crimean Peninsula, the most critical policy issue of Ukrainian-
Russian relationships is energy, especially the gas industry. The main task and aim of 
Russia’s energy strategy is to secure demand and use revenues generated from ensuring 
supply for different political and/or economic aims. At the moment Europe is seen as Russia’s 
main gas purchaser and this situation is expected to remain unchanged for a long time to 
come. Almost three quarters of Russian natural gas is sold in Europe (Ministry of Energy of 
the Russian Federation 2010). This means that the safety of gas trade to Europe is a 





The European Union and Russia are separated from each other by a number of gatekeeper 
states, the most important of which being the Ukraine, considering that 80-85 per cent of the 
Russian gas export arrives to Europe flowing through the country. Due to this, the Ukraine is 
also an uncircumventable factor in the EU’s gas import. Thus we can conclude that in the area 
of energy a number of EU member states, Moscow and Kiev depend on each other to a great 
extent. The recurring gas crises have shown the serious consequences of the fact that in the 
Ukraine the same gas-pricing system that is applied in the member states of the European 
Union did not function while trade took place through intermediary firms with obscure 
ownership. Although the treaty entering into force on 19 January 2009 seems to resolve both 
problems, whereby the parties have now switched to a quarterly settlement system similar to 
that of the member states of the EU and the intermediary role of RosUkrEnergo in gas trade 
will end, the debate can not be considered concluded at all. The parties most probably entered 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
cent do not access to water, 90 per cent have no asphalt roads, 96 per cent have no gas installed and they do not 
have a sewer system, either. For more details see Sevel (2009). 
20
 More details in Virág (2009). 
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into an agreement which puts an extraordinary burden on the Ukrainian budget and economy, 
already facing a tough situation while transparency still leaves a lot to be desired. 
 
6. Conclusion 
Ukrainian identity-consciousness shows an Eastern-Western duality well-defined in space. 
Cultural ideas originating from the past militate against one another. The situation is made 
complicated by the fact that the existing national myths show a less crystallised picture, and 
the political elite grown close to the economic elite also seems to be interested in the 
perpetuation of contrasts. 
 
The Ukraine belongs to those young countries, where democratisation and nation-building 
started approximately at the same time. While in Central Europe the development of nation 
states was usually preceded by the development of nations, the biggest dilemma in the 
Ukraine is whether a nation state programme – parallel to the aim of state-building – is able to 
bring an unfinished nation-building to completion. The question is given: How can the two 
processes of democratisation and nation-building be aligned with each other? Ukraine fell into 
a serious trap from the point of view of nation-building since groups of different identitites 
living in the country and the elite protecting their own interests have diverging ideas about the 
way it should be done. 
 
According to Linz and Stepan (1996) ‘the greater the ratio of the people in a given territorial 
unit who feel they do not want to be members of the given territorial unit, the harder it will be 
to strengthen democracy within the unit.’ Although many people see the possibility of a 
peaceful divide in Ukraine, it requires the existence of clear demarcation lines. Although the 
existence of an Eastern-Western division because of historical and ethnic reasons is clearly 
visible within the country, in the shorter term, other than further polarisation, we cannot 
expect the country to be divided into two parts due to the quasi-associate nature of Ukrainian 
and Russian-identity communities, their similarities and the economic interdependence of the 
two cultures, i. e. the inherent internal characteristics of the country. 
 
Ukraine sways with enormous amplitude between the EU and Russia. The alternating 
orientation between the West and the East can be traced back to the superpower ambitions 
reaching beyond Ukraine. Eventually, internal and external determinants are intertwined and 
mutually interact with one another. 
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The Ukraine is still at the stage of putting its national interests into words. But the 
establishment of a well-described national interest system is hardly achievable without 
coherent a national identity. However, it means that beyond the occasional agreements 
emerging on the level of the economic and political elite we can find mostly clan interests 
rather than national goals. One of the most important factors behind what seems to be the 
prevailing political elite’s unfledged geopolitical strategy and wavering diplomacy is 
precisely the uncertainty and lacking clarity about national interests and national identity. 
Thus the fundamental international players have serious thematising power regarding the 
external orientation of Ukraine. 
 
The most fundamental ones are the United States, the European Union and Russia. Among 
them recently Russia seems to be the most dominant, trying to bind Ukraine with direct 
political, economic, historical and information tools to itself. After the 2004 Orange 
Revolution it managed to keep the Ukraine within its sphere of interest, i.e. by making use of 
the foreign policy division within the EU and the international involvement of the United 
States. 
 
Based on this it can be concluded that the four hypotheses determined in the introduction were 
verified. The cultural ideas stemming from markedly different historical roots in the Eastern 
and Western parts of Ukraine militate against each other. The economic elite – taking 
advantage of the opportunities provided by the cultural cleavage – has an interest in 
perpetuating division in order to obtain/maintain state support. There is no national concept in 
politics seeking to achieve national reconciliation and rise above differences in sight. The 
myths on which the identities of the two opposing blocks are based are less crystallised, 
which has a conflict-mitigating effect. 
 
In my opinion, parallel to the economic crisis reaching Ukraine cultural conflicts will be 
gradually replaced by economy-related issues. Thus the problems relating to national identity 
will not be solved, but instead of internal orientations the presence of issues related to stability 
and security will increase, thus external orientations can become much more practice-
oriented. It can be concluded that no civil war-like ethnic conflicts or any serious internal 
tensile tests will stem from the Ukraine’s internal traits alone. The question remains however: 
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